January 19, 2018
Law & Motion Department Tentative Rulings
  • Law and Motion Department Tentative Ruling Line:  (650) 261-5019
  • Other Judges' tentatives: please reference the appropriate Case Number and Case Caption below and contact the appropriate department.

Telephonic Appearances (CourtCall): If an appearance is required or if a party has provided timely notice of intent to appear by 4:00 p.m. to the court and all parties, any party may appear telephonically through CourtCall. To do so, you must contact CourtCall at (888) 882-6878 no later than 4:30 p.m. on the court day prior to the hearing. Notifying CourtCall with your intent to appear is not an alternative to notifying the court. Please visit their website for more information. Please also see California Rule of Court No. 3.670.

 

In the Superior Court of the State of California

In and for the County of San Mateo

 

Special Set Calendar

Judge: Honorable JOSEPH C. SCOTT

Department 25

 

400 County Center, Redwood City

Courtroom 2G

 

Monday, January 8, 2018

 

IF YOU INTEND TO APPEAR ON ANY CASE ON THIS CALENDAR YOU MUST DO THE FOLLOWING:

1. YOU MUST CALL (650) 261-5019 BEFORE 4:00 P.M. TO INFORM THE COURT OF YOUR INTENT TO APPEAR.

2. You must give notice before 4:00 P.M. to all parties of your intent to appear pursuant to California Rules of Court 3.1308(a)(1).

 

Failure to do both items 1 and 2 will result in no oral presentation.

 

N.B. Notifying CourtCall with your intent to appear is not an alternative to notifying the court.  

 

All Counsel are reminded to comply with California Rule of Court 3.1110.  The Court will expect all exhibits to be tabbed accordingly. 

 

    Case                  Title / Nature of Case

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17-CIV-00502    ANDREW YOUNG, et al. vs. DUKE PARTNERS II, LLC, et al.

 

 

ANDREW YOUNG                           MARC D. BENDER

duke PARTNERS II, LLC                  SETH COX

 

 

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR AN ORDER SEVERING UD ACTION FOR TRIAL FOR FAILURE TO MAKE DEPOSITS TO ESCROW PER ORDER (CCP 1170.5)

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

The Motion to Sever the Unlawful Detainer Action from the Wrongful Foreclosure Action is GRANTED.  The court order consolidating the actions requires Andrew Young to pay Duke Partners $5,200 per month during the pendency of the action.  The declaration of Sam Chandra indicates that Young is in default on these payments.  While Young argues that payments are current, there is insufficient evidence to support this assertion.  The declaration of Marc Bender states only that he is informed and believes that Young is current.

 

Moving party is directed to prepare a written order consistent with the Court’s ruling for the Court’s signature, pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312, and provide notice thereof to the opposing party/counsel as required by law and the California Rules of Court.  The order is to be submitted directly to Judge Joseph C. Scott, Department 25.

 



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17-CIV-00776     LESLY PALOMINO vs. ELOY ARREOLA, et al.

 

 

LESLY PALOMINO                         PETER C. LABRADOR

ELOY ARREOLA                           JEROME BELLOTTI

 

 

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO COMPEL ANSWERS TO FORM INTERROGATORIES, AND DEMAND FOR PRODUCTION

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

The Motion is denied without prejudice.

 

Moving party has not established that the underlying discovery was properly served on plaintiff.  Plaintiff filed this action on February 22, 2017.  At that time plaintiff was represented by Peter Labrador.  Mr. Labrador died on March 6, 2017.  Plaintiff subsequently obtained an order substituting Juan Simon as attorney of record on July 6, 2017.  The Proof of service for the subject discovery indicates that it was served on plaintiff on August 11, 2017 by mail addressed to Mr. Labrador.  As a result, it is unclear whether plaintiff or her current counsel ever received it.

 

If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of the Court, pursuant to Rule 3.1308(a)(1), adopted by Local Rule 3.10, effective immediately, and no formal order pursuant to Rule 3.1312 or any other notice is required as the tentative ruling affords sufficient notice to the parties.

 

 



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17-CIV-00786     PARSONS TRANSPORTATION GROUP, et al. vs. PARSONS

                   TRANSPORTATION GROUP, et al.

 

 

Peninsula Corridor Joint Powers Board   LAUREL E. O'CONNOR

FEDERAL INSURANCE COMPANY              BENNETT J. LEE

 

 

3. CORRIDOR JOINT POWERS BOARD’S MOTION FOR ORDER COMPELLING DEFENDANT PRSONS TRANSPORTATION GROUP, INC.’S PERSON(S) MOST QUALIFIED TO ATTEND AND TESTIFY AT DEPOSITION

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

The Motion by Defendant and Cross-Complainant Peninsula Corridor Joint Powers Board to Compel the Person Most Qualified Deposition of Plaintiff and Cross-Defendant Parsons Transportation Group is GRANTED.  Parsons Transportation Group is ordered to designate the person or persons most qualified to testify on the subjects in question no later February 2, 2018 and produce such person or persons for deposition to commence on or before February 16, 2016 unless the parties agree in writing to an alternative schedule.

 

There is no motion for protective order pending before this court, but the request for protective order contained in the opposition to the motion to compel is DENIED.

 

Moving party is directed to prepare a written order consistent with the Court’s ruling for the Court’s signature, pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312, and provide notice thereof to the opposing party/counsel as required by law and the California Rules of Court.  The order is to be submitted directly to Judge Joseph C. Scott, Department 25.

 

 

4. PARSONS TRANSPORTATION GROUP’S APPLICATION TO APPEAR AS COUNSEL PRO HAC VICE

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

GRANTED.

 

Moving party is directed to prepare a written order consistent with the Court’s ruling for the Court’s signature, pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312, and provide notice thereof to the opposing party/counsel as required by law and the California Rules of Court.  The order is to be submitted directly to Judge Joseph C. Scott, Department 25.



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17-CIV-02047     BLANCA GUTIERREZ vs. CHRISTINA O'BRIEN, et al.

 

 

BLANCA GUTIERREZ                       MARIO A. MOYA

CRISTINA O’BRIEN                       JAMES FICENEC

 

 

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO DISQUALIFY COUNSEL

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

Off calendar at the request of the moving party.

 



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17-CIV-02217     MARGO ROBERTS vs. DEAN KEDES, et al.

 

 

MARGO ROBERTS                          HENRY GRADSTEIN

DEAN KEDES                             RONALD ROSSI

 

 

DEAN KEDES’S MOTION TO COMPEL A RESPONSE TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, AND FOR SANCTIONS

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

off calendar by stipulation of the parties.

 



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17-CIV-02971     PHILIP WILLIAMS, et al. vs. SCOTT C. BAIRD, et al.

 

 

PHILIP WILLIAMS                        JOSEPH W. CARCIONE, JR.

SCOTT BAIRD                            ARTHUR CURLEY

 

 

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO COMPEL PLAINTIFF PHILIP WILLIAMS’ FURTHER RESPONSES TO (1) SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET ONE AND (2) REUEST FOR MONETARY SANCTION AGAINST PLAINTIFF PHILIP WILLIAMS AND/OR HIS COUNSEL ON RECORD

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

The Motion to Compel Further Reponses from Plaintiff Philip Williams to Special Interrogatories (Set One) and Requests for Production of Documents (Set One) is granted. Monetary sanctions in the amount of $1000.00 shall be awarded to Defendants Scott Baird, D.M.D.; Azeem Lakha, D.M.D; and Azeem Lakha, a Professional Corporation (collectively, “Defendants”) and against plaintiff Philip Williams.

 

The Court finds that Defendants’ adequately satisfied the statutory meet and confer requirement.

 

There are six items of discovery at issue for the present motion—four Special Interrogatories (“SROGs”) numbered 10-12 and 33, and two Requests for Production of Documents (“RFPDs”) numbered 11 and 12.

 

The SROGs. Generally, the SROGs seek responses regarding:

 

·       the amounts paid for the medical services Plaintiff alleges he received to treat his infection that was allegedly caused by Defendants’ medical malpractice (see SROG 9)

 

·       the amounts of reimbursement or payment made on Plaintiff’s behalf from collateral sources (see SROGs 10-11), or

 

·       the amounts paid by Medicare (see SROG 33).

 

Plaintiff responded to these questions regarding amounts, but naming doctors without providing the amounts they charged for their services (see response to SROG 9), by wholesale declining to answer on the grounds that he “is unable to respond…at this time” (see response to SROGs 10-11), or by stating that his care provider was the Veteran’s Association (“VA”). These answers evade the questions being asked.

 

Plaintiff argues that it is not evasive to decline to answer such questions when he himself does not know the amounts about which Defendants are inquiring. However, the law imposes a duty upon a party responding to interrogatories to “make a reasonable and good faith effort to obtain the information by inquiry to other natural persons or organizations…” Code Civ.  Proc. § 2030.220(c); see also Weil & Brown, Cal. Prac. Guide: Civ. Proc. Before Trial (The Rutter Group, 2017) ¶ 8:1061, citing Deyo v. Kilbourne (1978) 84 CA3d 771, 782. On the facts available, it appears significantly easier for Plaintiff to request his own medical billing records than for Defendants to issue third party subpoenas for that same information. Indeed, though Plaintiff indicates in some responses that “[d]iscovery and information gather continues,” Plaintiff will ultimately need to produce evidence of damages at trial such that he will likely need to obtain this information at some point before trial.

 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds Plaintiff’s responses to be evasive and to fail to meet the legal obligation of making a reasonable good faith inquiry.

 

The RFPDs. Generally, the RFPDs seek documents regarding:

 

·         discussions between Plaintiff and any third parties regarding his claims (see RFPD 11), and

 

·         insurance policy information pertaining to any medical or dental plans that have paid, or may pay, for the medical expenses incurred to obtain the medical treatment that was necessitated by the malpractice alleged in this case (see RFPD 12).

 

Plaintiff responded to these requests by:

 

·       objecting to the first request on the grounds that it seeks premature disclosure of expert work product (see response to RFPD 11), and

 

·       stating that he has received all of his health care from the VA (see response to RFPD 12).

 

“If only part of an item or category… in a demand… is objectionable, the response shall contain a statement of compliance, or a representation of inability to comply with regard to the remainder of that item or category.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.240(a)).  RFPD 11 covers many communications other than just communications with an expert witnesses, and yet Plaintiff provided no response as to the non-objectionable portion. To the extent that Plaintiff argues that some of these documents may involve attorney work-product or attorney-client communications, that objection was not made in the response and thus is waived. (Weil & Brown, Cal. Prac. Guide: Civ. Proc. Before Trial (The Rutter Group, 2017) ¶ 8:1476.1, citing Stadish v. Sup.Ct. (Southern Calif. Gas Co. (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1130, 1141).

 

Defendants also argue that Plaintiff’s responses are evasive because they attempt to muddle the distinction between an entity that provides benefits (i.e. payment, such an insurance company or Medicare) from an entity that provides medical services (such as doctors, a hospital, or the VA). RFPD 12 inquires about insurance policies—not about medical providers like the VA. Defendants also point out that, though Plaintiff makes statements in his opposing arguments like the statement that he “has not sent or received such documents” (as to RFPD 11) or that he “does not have a copy of the insurance policy through the VA” (as to RFPD 12) are just arguments—not statements under penalty of perjury as is required when providing formal discovery responses. Defendants are entitled to have those representations verified. Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.250(a).

 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds Plaintiff’s responses to be evasive and to fail to meet the legal obligation of making a reasonable good faith inquiry.

 

Sanctions. With regard to both interrogatories and requests for admission, a court “shall” impose monetary sanctions unless there is substantial justification for opposing the motion or unless other circumstances make imposition of sanctions unjust. Code Civ. Proc.  §§ 2030.300(d) and 2031.310(h). There does not appear to be substantial justification for opposing this motion—particularly in light of Plaintiff’s failure to engage in meet and confer efforts, which constitutes a misuse of the discovery process, which is an independent ground for imposing sanctions. Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2023.011(i) and 2023.020.

 

Plaintiff shall provide supplemental, verified, responses to the subject discovery no later than February 2, 2018.

 

Sanctions totaling $1,000.00 shall be paid by Plaintiff to Defendants no later than February 2, 2018.

 

Moving party is directed to prepare a written order consistent with the Court’s ruling for the Court’s signature, pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312, and provide notice thereof to the opposing party/counsel as required by law and the California Rules of Court.  The order is to be submitted directly to Judge Joseph C. Scott, Department 25.



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17-CIV-03042     GERARDO ORTIZ vs. THEODORE CERRUTI, et al.

 

 

GERARDO ORTIZ                          DANIEL MARTINEZ DE LA VEGA

THEODORE CERRUTI                       KATARZYNA NOWAK

 

 

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO BE RELIEVED AS COUNSEL

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

Off calendar at the request of the moving attorney.

 

 



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17-CIV-03480     ALEXANDER MAYER, et al. vs. DAVID KONG, et al.

 

 

ALEXANDER MAYER                        CHRISTIAN P. FOOTE

MENLO PARK CHIROPRACTIC                PRO/PER            

 

 

PROUD THAI MASSAGE, LLC, ALEXANDER MAYER AND NUJARIN FAITH’S MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES FROM DAVID KONG TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS, SET ONE

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

The unopposed Motion to Compel defendant David Kong to provide further responses to Plaintiffs’ Request for Production of Documents, Set One (Nos. 1-11)  is GRANTED-IN-PART and DENIED-IN-PART.  Because Defendant Kong did not serve timely responses, all objections are waived. (Code Civ. Proc. Sect. 2031.300(a)).  Further, even if they had been timely asserted, Kong’s relevance and privacy objections would lack merit.  Discovery rights are broad, and Mayer et. al.’s request for a copy of the Master Lease, and request for communications between Kong, Dr. Woo, and the landlord relating to the lease/the property, are permissible discovery requests. 

 

Within 10 days of notice of entry of this Order, Defendant Kong shall serve amended responses to Plaintiffs’ Request for Production of Documents, Set One (Nos. 1-11), without objections.  As to Requests Nos. 1, 3, and 10, Kong’s response shall state that he agrees to produce all responsive documents in his possession, custody or control.  As to Requests Nos. 2, 4-9, and 11, Kong shall amend his responses to comply with Code Civ. Proc. Sect. 2031.230.  If Kong contends he has no documents responsive to these Requests, his verified response shall “affirm that a diligent search and a reasonable inquiry has been made” in effort to comply with the Request. 

 

Mayer et. al. motion for sanctions is DENIED on grounds the Notice of Motion does not provide notice of any sanctions request.  The Court is also cognizant of the fact that defendant Kong now represents himself, given the recent withdrawal of Mr. Hand, his prior attorney.

 

Moving party is directed to prepare a written order consistent with the Court’s ruling for the Court’s signature, pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312, and provide notice thereof to the opposing party/counsel as required by law and the California Rules of Court.  The order is to be submitted directly to Judge Joseph C. Scott, Department 25.



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17-CIV-04322     LORI RIGELMAN vs. IPASS, INC., et al.

 

 

LORI RIGELMAN                          ANDREA LOH

IPASS, INC.                            TERESA M. MAESTRELLI

 

 

IPASS INC. AND DARIN VICKERY’S HEARING ON DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF LORI RIGELMAN’S COMPLAINT FOR RETALIATION IN VIOLATION OF LABOR CODE 1102.5 AND 98.6

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

Demurrer to the sixth cause of action is sustained without leave to amend. Under former Labor Code section 1102.5 (“An employer shall not…”), an action could be brought only against the employer, and not against any person, agent, supervisor, or individual who committed the retaliation. The Legislature amended section 1102.5 (effective January 2014) to read “An employer, or any person acting on behalf of the employer shall not . . . .”  The issue for this demurrer is whether the words “or any person acting on behalf of the employer” permits imposing liability on an individual, rather than on only the employer.

 

In deciding an amendment's application, a court “must explore whether the amendment changed or merely clarified existing law.” (Carter v. California Dep't of Veterans Affairs (2006) 38 Cal.4th 914, 922.) No California appellate court has ruled on this issue. This court may consider relevant, unpublished federal district court opinions as persuasive, even if not binding. (Futrell v. Payday California, Inc. (2010) 190 Cal. App. 4th 1419, 1433.)  The Court finds persuasive the reasoning in Tillery v. Lollis, No. L14-CV-02025-KJM, 2015 WL 4873111, at *8-9 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2015).

 

The court in Tillery reviewed California precedent interpreting the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, which defines “employer” to include “any person acting as an agent of an employer....” The court concluded that California courts would interpret the virtually identical language of section 1102.5 to similarly exclude individual liability. (Tillery, 2015 WL 4873111, at *9 (citing Reno v. Baird (2008) 18 Cal. 4th 640, 645).) Similarly, a California Court stated, “Although on their face, these FEHA provisions could be read to hold individual supervisors personally liable, two Supreme Court cases and one appellate court case have established that individual supervisors and agents of employers cannot be held personally responsible under these FEHA statutes.” (Haligowski v. Superior Court (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 983, 990.)

 

Other related sections in the same statutory scheme as section 1102.5 limit liability to the employer. (See Berkeley Hillside Pres. v. City of Berkeley (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1086, 1099 (statute must be read “with, reference to the entire scheme of law of which it is part so that the whole may be harmonized and retain effectiveness.”) Labor Code sect. 1102.6 provides that after an employee shows activity that violates section 1102.5, “the employer shall have the burden of proof” to demonstrate that the conduct occurred for legitimate reasons. Similarly, section 1105 refers to only the employer: “nothing in this chapter shall prevent the injured employee from recovering damages from his employer for injury suffered through a violation of this chapter.”

 

Reading the statutory scheme as a whole indicates that only an employer may be liable for retaliation under Labor Code sect. 1102.5. Had the Legislature intended to increase liability to individuals, it would have amended the rest of the statutory scheme accordingly. It did not do so.

 

Plaintiff argues that the “plain language” of the statute controls and the use of the word “person” establishes that any person who engages in prohibited retaliation could be held personally liable. The Supreme Court disagrees with that argument. In Jones v. Lodge at Torrey Pines Partnership (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1158, a FEHA plaintiff asserted the same “plain language” argument. (Id. at 1162.) The Supreme Court held that the statutory language was not plain because there was more than one reasonable interpretation of the statute. (Id. at 1163.) The Court found that the Legislature did not intend to expand liability for FEHA retaliation against individuals, focusing on the fact that nowhere in the Legislative History was there any evidence that the Legislature intended to increase liability.

 

Similarly, Plaintiff in the present case points to nothing in the statute, case law, or legislative history of the 2013 amendment to section 1102.5 that suggests that the Legislature intended to expand liability to include individuals.

 

The Court rules that, as a matter of law, the sixth cause of action fails to state a claim against Defendant VICKERY.

 

Demurrer to the seventh cause of action is sustained without leave to amend. Labor Code section 98.6 imposes liability against only an employer.

 

If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of the Court. Thereafter, counsel for Defendant VICKERY shall prepare a written order consistent with the Court’s ruling for the Court’s signature, pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312, and provide written notice of the ruling to all parties who have appeared in the action, as required by law and the California Rules of Court.

 

 



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17-CIV-05112     BELMONT HOTELS, LLC vs. S&R DRYWALL, INC.

 

 

BELMONT HOTELS, LLC                    PAUL H. KIM

S&R DRYWALL, INC.                      DAVID MCKIM

 

 

S & R DRYWALL’S HEARING ON DEMURRER

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

Continued to February 2, 2018 at 9:00 a.m.in Dept. LM on the Court’s motion.

 

 



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CIV530381     WADE ROBERTSON VS. GREGORY BROD

 

 

WADE ROBERTSON                         Pro/PER

GREGORY BROD                           JOHN P. GIRARDE

 

 

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REQUIRE DEFENDANT CHERYL BURNS TO SEEK LEAVE OF THE COURT PRIOR TO THE FILING OF ANY UNTIMELY ANTI-SLAPP MOTION PER CCP 425.16

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

The motion is denied.  CCP §425.16(f) provides that a special motion to strike may be filed within 60 days of the service of the complaint or, in the court’s discretion, at any later time upon terms it deems proper.  In this case, defendant’s default was taken and plaintiff concedes that her motion for relief from default identified the special motion to strike as her proposed responsive pleading.

 

By granting the motion to set aside the default, the court implicitly exercised its discretion to permit the late filing of the special motion to strike and defendant did so within the time permitted by the court.

 

If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of the Court, pursuant to Rule 3.1308(a)(1), adopted by Local Rule 3.10, effective immediately, and no formal order pursuant to Rule 3.1312 or any other notice is required as the tentative ruling affords sufficient notice to the parties.

 

 

 



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CIV536193     DAMON BECNEL VS. THE COLLINGS FOUNDATION, ET AL.

 

 

DAMON BECNEL                           ARA JABAGCHOURIAN

THE COLLINGSFOUNDATION                 JOHN F. DOMINGUE

 

 

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR ORDER ESTABLISHING ADMISSIONS AND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

The motion is DENIED as untimely.   CCP §2024.020 provides that a party shall be entitled as a matter of right to have motions concerning discovery heard on or before the 15th day before the date initially set for trial of the action.  In this case, discovery closed prior to the June 6, 2017 trial date.  There is no indication that discovery cut-off was extended consistent with the current trial date. 

 

If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of the Court, pursuant to Rule 3.1308(a)(1), adopted by Local Rule 3.10, effective immediately, and no formal order pursuant to Rule 3.1312 or any other notice is required as the tentative ruling affords sufficient notice to the parties.

 

 

 



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CIV537487     RENEE AMADIO VS. REDWOOD CITY

 

 

RENEE AMADIO                           LAWRENCE E. KERN

REDWOOD CITY                           TOOD MASTER

 

 

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO COMPEL PLAINTIFF’S RESPONSES TO DISCOVERY REQUESTS AND AWARD SANCTIONS

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

Off calendar at the request of the moving party.

 

 



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CIV537740     JOSE VERDUSCO VS. ANDY MAR, COUNTY OF SAN MATEO

 

 

JOSE VERDUSCO                          TODD P. EMANUEL

ANDY MAR                               GRANT A. WINTER

 

 

COUNTY OF SAN MATEO’S MOTION TO QUASH OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFF’S DEPOSITION OF SHERIFF CARLOS BOLANOS

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

The Motion of Defendant County of San Mateo (“Defendant”) to Quash, or in the alternative, for a Protective Order regarding Plaintiff Jose Verdusco’s (“Plaintiff”) Deposition of Sheriff Carlos Bolanos (“Sheriff”), is ruled on as follows:

 

In opposition, Plaintiff submits a declaration by Plaintiff’s counsel titled “Declaration of Counsel Todd P. Emanuel” that is signed by Todd P. Emanuel.  However, the declaration states “I, Pamela E. Glazner, declare….”  Therefore, Plaintiff has not offered any competent evidence in opposition.

 

The County’s motion for a protective order is GRANTED.  Plaintiff has not established that the Sheriff has any unique or superior knowledge of discoverable information.      (See Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Sup. Ct. (1992) 10 Cal.Ap.4th 1282, 1289.)  Plaintiff also fails to demonstrate that the Sheriff has any necessary information to this case.  (See id. [once less intrusive methods of discovery are exhausted and the plaintiff makes a showing of good cause that the high level official possesses necessary information to the case, the trial court may lift the protective order and allow the deposition to proceed].)  A protective order is to remain in place as to the Sheriff’s deposition absent further order of the court. 

 

The Court does not reach Defendant’s request concerning the trial subpoena of the Sheriff as this issue is not properly before the court.

 

Moving party is directed to prepare a written order consistent with the Court’s ruling for the Court’s signature, pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312, and provide notice thereof to the opposing party/counsel as required by law and the California Rules of Court.  The order is to be submitted directly to Judge Joseph C. Scott, Department 25.

 



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CLJ536792     CRDILOGICAL SYSTEMS, LLC VS. JMW CARPET & FLOORING

 

 

CREDILOGICAL SYSTEMS, LLC              FRANKLIN J. LOVE

JMW CARPET AD FLOORING, INC.            Pro/PER

 

 

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

The unopposed motion is granted.  Defendant shall provide verified responses, without objection, to the requests for production of documents no later than February 2, 2018.  

 

The request for sanctions is also granted pursuant to CCP §2031.300(c).   Defendant shall pay plaintiff $465 no later than February 2, 2018.

 

Moving party is directed to prepare a written order consistent with the Court’s ruling for the Court’s signature, pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312, and provide notice thereof to the opposing party/counsel as required by law and the California Rules of Court.  The order is to be submitted directly to Judge Joseph C. Scott, Department 25.

 


 

 

 

 

 

 


POSTED:  3:00 PM

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