March 22, 2017
Law & Motion Department Tentative Rulings
  • Law and Motion Department Tentative Ruling Line:  (650) 261-5019
  • Other Judges' tentatives: please reference the appropriate Case Number and Case Caption below and contact the appropriate department.

Telephonic Appearances (CourtCall): If an appearance is required or if a party has provided timely notice of intent to appear by 4:00 p.m. to the court and all parties, any party may appear telephonically through CourtCall. To do so, you must contact CourtCall at (888) 882-6878 no later than 4:30 p.m. on the court day prior to the hearing. Notifying CourtCall with your intent to appear is not an alternative to notifying the court. Please visit their website for more information. Please also see California Rule of Court No. 3.670.

 

In the Superior Court of the State of California

In and for the County of San Mateo

 

Law and Motion Calendar

Judge: Honorable RICHARD H. DuBOIS

Department 16

 

400 County Center, Redwood City

Courtroom 7A

 

Monday, March 20, 2017

 

NOTICE TO ALL COUNSEL

 

Until further order of the Court, no endorsed-filed “courtesy copy” of pleadings is required to be provided to the Law and Motion Department.

 

 

IF YOU INTEND TO APPEAR ON ANY CASE ON THIS CALENDAR YOU MUST DO THE FOLLOWING:

 

1. YOU MUST CALL (650) 261-5019 BEFORE 4:00 P.M. TO INFORM THE COURT OF YOUR INTENT TO APPEAR.

2. You must give notice before 4:00 P.M. to all parties of your intent to appear pursuant to California Rules of Court 3.1308(a)(1).

 

Failure to do both items 1 and 2 will result in no oral presentation.

 

Notifying CourtCall with your intent to appear is not an alternative to notifying the court.

 

All Counsel are reminded to comply with California Rule of Court 3.1110.  The Court will expect all exhibits to be tabbed accordingly. 

 

    Case                  Title / Nature of Case

9:00

LINE 1

16-CIV-00141     NOAM KEDEM vs. NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC.

 

 

 

NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC.             Amir M. Nassihi

NOAM KEDEM                             Justin T. Berger

 

 

Demurrer

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

This case has been designated a complex civil matter and, therefore, the motion is dropped from calendar and will be rescheduled by the complex civil court.

 



9:00

Line: 2

16-CLJ-02005      BANK OF AMERICA, N.A. vs. ADRIAN F. KROSNICK

 

 

BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.                  DONALD SHERRILL

ADRIAN F. KROSNICK                     Pro/PER

 

 

MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED.  The complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and the answer does not state facts sufficient to constitute a defense to the complaint.  CCP Sec. 438(c)(1)(A).  Judgment shall be entered in favor of plaintiff in the amount of $10,956.25.  Costs shall be awarded pursuant to CRC 3.1700. 

 

If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of the Court, pursuant to CRC Rule 3.1308(a)(1), adopted by Local Rule 3.10.  If the tentative ruling is uncontested, Plainiff is directed to prepare, circulate, and submit a written order and judgment reflecting this Court’s ruling verbatim for the Court’s signature, consistent with the requirements of CRC Rule 3.1312.  The proposed order and judgment is to be submitted directly to Judge Richard H. DuBois, Department 16.

 



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Line: 3

CIV518068     JANINE HERNANDEZ VS. ENTERPRISE HOLDINGS, INC., et al.

 

 

JANINE HERNANDEZ                       AARON MARKOWITZ

VANGUARD CAR RENTAL USA                DOUGLAS W. SULLIVAN

 

 

motion to compel further RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION, SET ONE, PROPOINDED ON JANINE HERNANDEZ AND REQUESTS FOR MONETARY SANCTIONS

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

This matter is dropped from calendar at the request of the moving party.

 



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Line: 4

CIV530374    VULCAN WARBIRDS, INC. VS. THE COLLINGS FOUNDATION, et al.

 

 

VULCAN WARBIRDS INC.                   PHILIP L. GREGORY

AUCTIONS AMERICA BY RM, INC.           ASHLEY R. FICKEL

 

 

Motion to tax costs

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

This matter is continued to April 12, 2017 at 9:00 a.m. in the Law and Motion calendar.

 



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Line: 5

CIV535197     ADRIAN RODRIGUEZ, ET AL. Vs. MILLS PENINSULA MEDICAL

 

 

ADRIAN RODRIGUEZ                       Philip michels

PEDIATRIX MEDICAL GROUP OF CALIFORNIA  GEORGE E. CLAUSE

 

 

Motion to be relieved as counsel

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

The motion by the Law Firm of Michels & Lew to be relieved as counsel for Plaintiff is GRANTED.  Plaintiff, through its guardian ad litem, is advised that it must retain substitute counsel because a guardian ad litem may not appear in pro per.

 

If the matter is contested, the law firm shall be prepared to disclose to the court, in an in camera hearing, the nature of the conflict between attorney and client.

 

If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of the Court, pursuant to CRC Rule 3.1308(a)(1), adopted by Local Rule 3.10.  If the tentative ruling is uncontested, the Law Firm is directed to prepare, circulate, and submit a written order reflecting this Court’s ruling for the Court’s signature, consistent with the requirements of CRC Rule 3.1312.  The proposed order is to be submitted directly to Judge Richard H. DuBois, Department 16.

 

 



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Line: 6

CIV537205     ACSEL HEALTH, LLC VS. CAMPBELL ALLIANCE GROUP, INC.

 

 

ACSEL HEALTH, LLC                      THOMAS M. MCINERNEY

CAMPBELL ALLIANCE GROUP, INC.          JONATHAN EDWARD SOMMER

 

 

motion for protective order and for Sanctions by Defendant Campbell Alliance Group, Inc.

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

Defendant CAMPBELL ALLIANCE GROUP, INC.’s Motion for Protective Order is GRANTED pursuant to Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2030.090, 2031.060, and 2033.080. 

 

Plaintiff’s current set of discovery requests, attached to the Declaration of Kyle Withers as Exhibits L-P, is stayed pending resolution of the jurisdictional issue.  1880 Corp. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 840, 843; Chitwood v. County of Los Angeles (1971) 14 Cal.App.3d 522, 527-28.  In so ruling, the Court accepts Defendant’s assertion that it will soon be filing a demurrer to the First Amended Complaint and renewing its motion to stay/dismiss.  This order is without prejudice to Plaintiff re-serving Defendant with limited jurisdictional discovery in the interim.  The intent of this ruling is to stay all discovery, with the exception of limited jurisdictional issue discovery, until this case is ultimately dismissed and sent to North Carolina OR an order entered allowing the case to be continued on the merits in California.

 

The parties’ respective requests for monetary sanctions are DENIED.   

 

If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of the Court, pursuant to Rule 3.1308(a)(1), adopted by Local Rule 3.10, effective immediately, and no formal order pursuant to Rule 3.1312 or any other notice is required as the tentative ruling affords sufficient notice to the parties.

 



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Line: 7

CIV537461      ROAD AND ROOF CONSTRUCTION company VS. ECC

                   INTERNATIONAL

 

 

ROAD AND ROOF CONSTRUCTION COMPANY     WILLIAM D. KOPPER

ECC International                      Dianne l. sweeny

 

 

MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT TO INCLUDE ENVIRONMENTAL CHEMICAL CORP AS AN ADDITIONAL JUDGMENT DEBTOR

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

For the reasons explained below, Plaintiff Road and Roof Construction Company’s (RRCC) Motion to Amend Judgment to Include Environmental Chemical Corp. (ECC) as an additional debtor on the existing Judgment against Defendant Environmental Chemical Corp., Inc. (ECCI), is GRANTED. 

As a threshold matter, the Court disagrees with ECC’s contention that the March 2015 Settlement Agreement and Mutual Release bars the Court from reaching the alter ego issue, or from adding ECC to the Judgment as an additional debtor, on grounds that ECC was expressly released from liability.  The Court does agrees that ECC, as ECCI’s parent and owner, is an “affiliated company” under the Release, per the commonly understood meaning of the word “affiliated,” and disagrees with RRCC’s argument to the contrary.  There is no evidence the contracting parties intended to apply any specialized or unusual definition of “affiliated.”  And RRCC’s argument appears irreconcilable with its contention that ECC and ECCI are alter egos.  Presumably, if two entities are not even “affiliated,” they would not be alter egos.  The Court also agrees that ECCI President Mr. Asem’s after-the-fact declaration expressing his subjective belief and understanding, at the time he signed the Release, as to the meaning of the term “affiliated companies” is irrelevant, because contract interpretation is based on the language used, not subjective intent.  (Feb. 24, 2017 Asem Decl.).  But these issues do not control, for multiple reasons.  First, the Release is contingent on payment of the consideration for the Release, namely, the $2.5 million.  ECC is not released because the consideration for the Release has not been paid.  Feb. 17, 2017 Vohra Decl., Parag. 18 (admitting ECCI still owes RRCC over $2 million plus interest per the Settlement Agreement and Judgment).  Second, and as a separate reason for reaching the alter ego argument, a finding that ECC and ECCI are alter egos would mean they stand in the same shoes for purposes of the Judgment.  If the two entities are alter egos, then ECC is not a third party “affiliate,” but rather, the same entity that signed the Agreement and promised to pay to RRCC $2.5 million, but has not paid.  Accordingly, the Court will address the merits of the alter ego claim. 

 

Code of Civ. Proc. Sect. 187 authorizes the Court to amend a judgment to add an additional debtor.  As a general rule, a court may amend its judgment at any time so that the judgment will properly designate the real defendants.  Carolina Cas. Ins. Co. v. LM Ross Logger, LLP (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 1181, 1188; Greenspan v. LADT, LLC (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 486, 508.  Judgments may be amended to add additional judgment debtors on the ground that a person or entity is the alter ego of the original judgment debtor.  Id.  Amendment of a judgment to add an alter ego is an equitable procedure based on the theory that the court is not adding a new defendant, but is merely inserting the correct name of the real defendant.  Id.  To prevail on a motion to amend a judgment, the creditor must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that: (1) the party to be added as judgment debtor had control of the underlying litigation and was virtually represented in that proceeding; (2) there is such a unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the two entities no longer exist; and (3) an inequitable result will follow if the actions are treated as those of the named defendant alone.  Highland Springs Conference and Training Center v. City of Banning, 244 Cal.App.4th 267, 280 (2016); Zoran Corp. v. Chen (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 811-12 (setting forth a long list of factors relevant to the alter ego analysis).  In making this determination, no one factor is dispositive; rather, the Court considers all relevant facts and circumstances.  Zoran Corp., supra, at 811-12.

As a general rule, treating one corporation or entity as the alter ego of another is “an extreme remedy” to be used sparingly.  Sonora Diamond Corp. v. Sup. Ct. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 523, 538-9; Las Palmas Associates v. Las Palmas Center Assocs. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1220, 1248-9; Santa Clarita Organization for Planning and the Environment v. Castaic Lake Water Agency, 1 Cal.App.5th 1084, 1105 (2016).  Still, “the greatest liberality is to be encouraged in allowing judgments to be amended to add the ‘real defendant,’ or alter ego of the original judgment debtor, ‘in order to see that justice is done.’ Highland Springs, supra, at 281, citing Carr v. Barnabey’s Hotel Corp. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 14, 20-22 (even if the formal elements necessary to establish alter ego liability are not present, an unnamed party may be included as a judgment debtor for equitable reasons to prevent an injustice); Greenspan v. LADT, supra, at 508.  Similarly, as a general rule, members of a limited liability company, in this case a Delaware LLC, are not responsible for the debts and obligations of the LLC merely by virtue of being a member.  Del. LLC Act., Sect. 18-303. 

Having considered the evidence presented in light of the governing legal standard, the Court agrees with RRCC that ECC effectively controlled the underlying litigation/arbitration and was adequately represented in that proceeding.  The Court also finds there is a unity of interest between ECC and ECCI such that the separate personalities of the two entities do not meaningfully exist, at least with respect the parties’ relationship and the Settlement Agreement and resulting Judgment.  The Court further finds that recognizing the separateness of the two entities in this case would yield an inequitable result.  In reaching this conclusion, the Court considers the following facts to be particularly relevant.

 

First, ECC and ECCI have a substantial overlap in Officers/personnel, which weighs in favor of an alter ego finding and establishes that ECC controlled the arbitration and was sufficiently represented in that proceeding.  Zoran Corp., supra, at 811-12 (overlap of owners, Officers, and Directors weighs in favor of an alter ego finding).  ECCI is a wholly-owned subsidiary of ECC.  Feb. 17 Vohra Decl., Parag. 5.  ECCI has one member—ECC.  That is to say, except for ECC, there is no person or entity with any financial interest in ECCI.  The principals of the two entities overlap, although not entirely, to a considerable extent.  They share the same President, Mr. Vohra.  Thomason Tr. at 7-8.  They share (or until very recently shared) the same General Counsel, Mr. Sweatt, who is also a VP of ECC.  Until recently, they shared the same Chief Financial Officer, Mr. Kemp, who is/was also a Director of both entities.  Id. at 8-9.  Mr. Sabharwal, who Chairs the ECC Board of Directors and who signed ECCI’s Operating Agreement, was personally involved in the ECCI-RRCC settlement.  Thomason Tr. at 7; Feb. 17 Vohra Decl., Parag. 1.  Together, Mr. Sabharwal and Mr. Vohra (President of both entities) own a controlling percentage (51%) of ECC.  Mr. Thomason, ECC’s Chief Accounting Officer, testified that ECC paid ECCI’s attorneys legal fees for the litigation and arbitration, and that Mr. Sweatt, in his position as ECC’s VP of Contracts & Compliance, hired ECCI’s attorneys and managed the litigation/arbitration.  Thomason Tr. at 72-3.  Further, Mr. Thomason, who testified as ECCI’s representative at the ECCI debtor’s examination, is a consultant for ECC and is paid only by ECC (not by ECCI).  Thomason Tr. at 16.  Based on this evidence, the Court finds that ECC controlled the arbitration and was adequately represented in that proceeding. 

 

Second, on multiple occasions, to multiple third parties, ECC has acted as a guarantee for ECCI, and represented to third parties that the two entities are “de facto Joint Venture partners.”  In April 2015, at about the same time ECC authorized ECCI’s Settlement with RRCC, the two entities made a joint bid for a government contracting project, and “certified” to the State Department the following:  “ECCI is a wholly-owned subsidiary of ECC”; “all business structures (accounting, payroll, human resources, etc.) between ECCI and ECC are the same”; “ECCI and ECC are de facto Joint Venture partners”; “ECC guarantees the performance of ECCI, its wholly-owned subsidiary, and de-facto joint venture partner for all obligations with respect to the Project”…. this guarantee “shall continue until all obligations . . . have been satisfied or until liability has been completely discharged”; “ECC agrees to be joint and severally liable with its wholly owned subsidiary, and de-facto joint venture partner ECCI for the performance of any contract awarded for the Project.”  The foregoing document, was signed in the Burlingame, Ca. office shared by both entities, by (a) Mr. Sweatt, under his title “Director, VP Contracts & Compliance,” a position held only with ECC, and (b) Mr. Vohra, President of both entities.  Ex. GG to ECC’s post-reply.  Nor was this a one-time representation; it appears ECC has made these same representations several times in the past in an attempt to obtain government contracts.  March 1, 2017 Vohra Decl., Parag. 3.  ECC now seeks to retreat from these representations, arguing they are irrelevant, and were made only because the State Department required such representations in order to consider ECCI’s various bids.  Vohra Decl., Parag. 25.  But they are certified statements, signed by the head of both entities, that are either true or untrue.  The statement that “All business structures   . . . between ECCI and ECC are the same” cannot be true for one project only.  Further, these repeated representations demonstrate ECC has, in many instances, agreed to be a financial guarantee for ECCI, and agreed to be jointly and severally liable for ECCI, which weighs in favor of finding a unity of interest.  Similarly, ECC has agreed to indemnify ECCI’s sureties in the event ECCI was unable to pay.  Vohra Parag. 9; Abbasi Decl., Ex. BB at Parag. 13 (Liberty Mutual stating it agreed to loan ECCI over $58 million, and that ECCI “and its affiliates” are jointly and severally liable for the loan).   The Court finds these facts significant.  

 

While ECCI has in the past leased other office space overseas (and in Virginia), the two entities share the same office as their principal place of business, located at 1240 Bayshore Highway, Burlingame, Ca.  (See ECCI Operating Agr.).  Zoran Corp. v. Chen, supra, at 811-12 (shared office space is a factor in the alter ego analysis). 

Further, ECC’s and ECCI’s service and expense-sharing practice, and what appears to have been a fairly free flow of money between the two entities, blurs the distinction between the two entities and cuts against the appearance of separateness.  Zoran Corp. v. Chen, supra, at 811-12 (discussing commingling/combining of funds/assets and failure to segregate funds).  See Abbasi Decl., Parag. 4-6, 23-25 (the two entities share finance, accounting, HR, and legal services for the purpose of saving cost; explaining that ECCI is charged by ECC for doing its payroll, accounting, HR, legal services, and for overhead and other administrative costs); when ECCI receives a payment, that revenue is credited to the appropriate ECCI project account within the consolidated accounting system); Vohra Decl., Parag. 4 (combining services in this manner helps insure efficiency and cost-saving for entities in a parent-subsidiary relationship).  Further, it appears that when making payments to third parties, ECCI’s standard practice, even before the current financial difficulties, was to transfer money first to ECC, and ECC would then make a wire transfer payment to ECCI’s clients/subcontractors, ostensibly because ECCI’s bank account had no ability to make outgoing wire transfers.  Thomason Tr. at 19-20; see also Abbasi Decl, Parag. 7 (“as part of shared accounting services and support that ECC provides to ECCI, ECC has handled accounts payable and accounts receivable work for ECCI for years.  This has included receiving funds from ECCI clients, applying those funds to the appropriate ECCI project and paying monies to ECCI’s vendors for that ECCI project.  For many years, one way ECC provided these services was utilizing an ECCI bank account with Comerica.”).  The Court sees these facts not as evidence of illegality, but as evidence of actions that significantly blurred the separation of the two entities, which supports a finding of unity of interest.  It may have been cheaper to combine resources, handle all of ECCI’s finances, and freely transfer money between the two entities’ bank accounts, but doing so cuts against separateness.

RRCC notes that two entities file a joint tax return every year.  ECC argues, in response, that parents and subsidiaries commonly file consolidated tax returns, which authorized by the IRS, and in this case, required by ECCI’s Operating Agreement.  Vohra Decl., Parag. 22.   Filing a joint return is legal and perhaps common, but, while not in itself an overly compelling fact, it also cuts against separateness.  

While it has not changed the result, the Court does not agree, or at least does not agree the evidence demonstrates, as RRCC suggests, that ECC closed ECCI’s Comerica bank account in a fraudulent attempt to thwart RRCC and other creditors.  The evidence indicates that ECCI’s surety, Liberty Mutual, which had substantial control over ECCI’s assets by 2015, closed that account.  Abbasi Decl., Parag. 11-12, 18, 20-21 (ECCI’s sureties had substantial control over ECCI’s funds starting about April 2015; the sureties closely monitored incoming funds; by late 2015, only one ECCI customer was still making payments to ECCI’s Comerica account).  Campbell Decl., Ex. M (document establishing Liberty Mutual’s control over the Comerica account, and showing that ECCI assigned to Liberty “all of its rights and interests in all deposits, wherever located”); Abbasi Decl., Ex. BB (indicating Liberty Mutual had priority right to ECCI’s assets, superior to other ECCI creditors); Vohra Decl., Para. 19 (same). 

Nor is the Court’s decision based on alleged under-capitalization.  Reply at 14.  ECCI’s current financial plight does not prove ECC intentionally depleted ECCI’s accounts or kept it underfunded to thwart creditors.  This argument also focuses only on the present, whereas the parties’ relationship began in 2007, when ECCI was, according to Mr. Vohra, a “growing company” with 100 employees.  And from 2007-2010, ECCI apparently paid RRCC $15.5 million of the $18 million designated in their contracts.  Vohra Decl., Parag. 19.  ECCI offers evidence it averaged $120 million in revenue each year from 2012-2015, and $45 million in 2016.  Vohra Decl., Parag. 19.  The RRCC-ECCI dispute arose in 2009, and the arbitration took place from 2013-15, when ECCI had annual revenues of $120 million.  ECC emphasizes that it “advanced” roughly $95 million to ECCI in the past several years (plus “millions more in services”) because, as ECCI’s sole member, ECC had a strong interest in keeping ECCI out of financial difficulty.  Vohra Decl., Parag. 9.  The fact that ECC made substantial cash infusions to ECCI does cut against the argument that ECCI was intentionally undercapitalized, but this fact is also consistent with the other evidence indicating the two entities were a quasi joint enterprise with a substantial unity of interest. 

 

For largely the same reasons, the Court also finds that recognizing ECC and ECCI’s separateness for purposes of the Judgment would yield an inequitable result.  As stated, ECC controlled the arbitration.  ECC’s VP of Contracts signed the Settlement Agreement on behalf of ECCI, promising that in exchange for RRCC’s agreement to forego its $5 million claim, ECCI would “pay in full” $2.5 million to RRCC, which ECC likely knew, at the time, that ECCI could not pay.  Abbasi Decl., Parag. 11 (“By the spring of 2015, ECCI was in serious financial distress”); Vohra Decl., Parag. 2-3 (stating that well before 2015, ECCI was in “serious financial distress.”).  From the Court’s perspective, ECC’s and ECCI’s relationship and interests were so closely intertwined that adding ECC as an additional Judgment debtor is the far more equitable outcome.  

 

RRCC’s Objections to Evidence are ruled upon as follows:

 

·         Vohra Decl., p. 1, lines 9-11.  OVERRULED.

·         Vohra Decl., p. 1, lines 20-22.  OVERRULED.

·         Vohra Decl., p. 2, lines 5-6.  OVERRULED.

·         Vohra Decl., p. 3, line 12.  SUSTAINED.  Evid. Code Sect. 403, 702.

·         Vohra Decl., p. 4, lines 4-5.  OVERRULED.

·         Vohra Decl., p. 4.c quote.  OVERRULED.

·         Vohra Decl., p. 4, lines 7-9.  SUSTAINED.  Evid. Code Sect. 403, 702.

·         Vohra Decl., p. 4, lines 18-19.  OVERRULED.

·         Vohra Decl., p. 5, line 1.  OVERRULED.

·         Vohra Decl., p. 5, lines 4-8.  OVERRULED.

·         Vohra Decl., p. 5, lines 14-16.  OVERRULED. 

·         Vohra Decl., p. 5, lines 22-24.  OVERRULED.   

·         Vohra Decl., p. 6, lines 3-4.  OVERRULED.  

·         Vohra Decl., p. 7, lines 3-6.  OVERRULED.   

·         Vohra Decl., p. 8, lines 3-4.   OVERRULED. 

·         Vohra Decl., p. 10, lines 9-10.   SUSTAINED.  Evid. Code Sect. 403, 801.

·         Vohra Decl., p. 10, lines 20-24.  OVERRULED.  There is sufficient foundation for the testimony.  The objection here goes more to weight than admissibility. 

·         Vohra Decl., p. 11, lines 9-11.  SUSTAINED.  Evid. Code Sect. 800.

·         Thomason Decl., p. 1, lines 16-17.  OVERRULED. 

·         Thomason Decl., p. 1, lines 17-21.  OVERRULED. 

·         Thomason Decl., p. 1, lines 22-23.  OVERRULED. 

·         Thomason Decl., p. 2, line 1.  SUSTAINED.  Slightly misstates the testimony.

·         Thomason Decl., p. 2, lines 4-7.  OVERRULED. 

·         Thomason Decl., p. 2, lines 9-11.  OVERRULED. 

·         Campbell Decl., Exs. A-O.  OVERRULED.  As discussed below (see documents attached to Kopper Decl.), both parties have objected to documents attached to attorney declarations on grounds they are not properly authenticated.  ECCI’s counsel can testify that certain documents were produced at the debtor’s examination.  The Court has considered the documents and given them the weight it deems appropriate.  

·         Abbasi Decl., p. 2, lines 3-9.  OVERRULED. 

·         Abbasi Decl., p. 2, lines 13-17.  SUSTAINED as to the first sentence (Evid. Code Sect. 403, 702), OVERRULED as to the second sentence.

·         Abbasi Decl., p. 3, lines 4-6.  OVERRULED.  There is sufficient foundation for the testimony.  The objection here goes more to weight than admissibility.  

·         Abbasi Decl., p. 3, lines 25-27.  OVERRULED. 

·         Abbasi Decl., p. 4, lines 7-8.  OVERRULED.  There is sufficient foundation for the testimony.  The objection here goes more to weight than admissibility.   

·         Abbasi Decl., p. 4, lines 9-10.  OVERRULED.  

·         Abbasi Decl., Parags. 11-21.  OVERRULED.  Plaintiff does not specify the specific portions of the testimony to which the objection is directed.  There is sufficient foundation for the testimony as a whole.  Questions about the declarant’s personal knowledge go to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility.  

·         Abbasi Decl., Ex. CC, DD, and EE.  OVERRULED. 

 

ECC’s Objections to Evidence (filed March 1, 2017) are ruled upon as follows:

 

·         Feb. 24, 2017 Kopper Decl., p. 1:21-2:1; p. 2:10-15, and Ex. 9.  SUSTAINED-IN-PART and OVERRULED-IN-PART.  The documents speak for themselves.  The Court has considered the documents but disregarded counsel’s summary/characterization of them.  Counsel can testify that certain documents were produced in response to a subpoena.  As discussed above regarding documents attached to the Campbell Decl., the Court has considered the documents and given them the weight it

·         deems appropriate.     

·         Feb. 24, 2017 Asem Decl., p. 2:1-14.  OVERRULED.  All of the stated objections go to the weight the Court gives to this testimony, if any, not to its admissibility. 

 

 

If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of the Court, pursuant to CRC Rule 3.1308(a)(1), adopted by Local Rule 3.10.  If the tentative ruling is uncontested, prevailing party is directed to prepare, circulate, and submit a written order reflecting this Court’s ruling verbatim for the Court’s signature, consistent with the requirements of CRC Rule 3.1312.  The proposed order is to be submitted directly to Judge Richard H. DuBois, Department 16.

 



9:00

Line: 8

CIV538729     STEPHEN CHIN, ET AL. VS. MATT LEVY, ET AL.

 

 

STEPHEN CHIN                           DAVID G. FINKELSTEIN

MATT LEVY                              LANCE BURROW

 

 

motion to amend ANSWER AND CROSS-COMPLAINT

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

Defendants’ Motion to Amend Answer and Cross-Complaint is GRANTED, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure secs. 473 and 576.

The court may in its discretion, after notice to the adverse party, allow, upon any terms as may be just, an amendment to any pleading or proceeding in other particulars. Code of Civ. Proc. sec. 473(a)(1). Amendments may be allowed before or after commencement of trial. Code of Civ. Proc. sec. 576.  Plaintiff’s answer to the current Cross-Complaint shall serve as the answer to the Amended Cross-omplaint.

 

Defendants are further ordered to provide complete responses to the Plaintiffs’ Special Interrogatories nos. 1-12 no later than 10 days before trial (March 31, 2017) with regard to the new claims in the Defendants’ Amended Cross-Complaint.

 

If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of the Court, pursuant to Rule 3.1308(a)(1), adopted by Local Rule 3.10, effective immediately, and no formal order pursuant to Rule 3.1312 or any other notice is required as the tentative ruling affords sufficient notice to the parties.

 



9:00

Lines: 9 & 10

CLJ531647     IN RE: $925.00

 

 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA  Crystal T. Chau

DOMINIC JACKSON                        PRO/PER

 

 

9. MOTION FOR ORDER THAT REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS BE DEEMED ADMITTED AND FOR MONETARY SANCTIONS

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

This matter is dropped from calendar at the request of the moving party.

 

 

10. MOTION TO COMPEL ANSWERS TO INTERROGATORIES AND FOR SANCTIONS

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

This matter is dropped from calendar at the request of the moving party.

 



9:00

Line: 11

CLJ534024     IN RE: $1,173.00

 

 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA      Crystal T. Chau

MATHHEW LUSK

 

 

11. MOTION TO COMPEL ANSWERS TO INTERROGATORIES AND FOR SANCTIONS

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

Plaintiff’s unopposed motion to compel answers is GRANTED.  Interested Party Matthew Lusk shall provide verified responses, without objection, to the interrogatories within 10 days. 

 

The request for sanctions is also granted pursuant to CCP Sections 2030.290(c), and 2033.280(c).  Interested Party shall pay petitioner $175 within 10 days. 

 

If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of the Court, pursuant to CRC Rule 3.1308(a)(1), adopted by Local Rule 3.10.  If the tentative ruling is uncontested, prevailing party is directed to prepare, circulate, and submit a written order reflecting this Court’s ruling verbatim for the Court’s signature, consistent with the requirements of CRC Rule 3.1312.  The proposed order is to be submitted directly to Judge Richard H. DuBois, Department 16.

 

12. MOTION FOR ORDER THAT REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS BE DEEMED ADMITTED AND FOR MONETARY SANCTIONS

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

Plaintiff’s unopposed motion is GRANTED.  The genuineness of any documents and the truth of any matters in the requests for admission are deemed admitted. 

 

The request for sanctions is also granted pursuant to CCP Sections 2030.290(c), and 2033.280(c).  Interested Party shall pay petitioner $175 within 10 days. 

 

If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of the Court, pursuant to CRC Rule 3.1308(a)(1), adopted by Local Rule 3.10.  If the tentative ruling is uncontested, prevailing party is directed to prepare, circulate, and submit a written order reflecting this Court’s ruling verbatim for the Court’s signature, consistent with the requirements of CRC Rule 3.1312.  The proposed order is to be submitted directly to Judge Richard H. DuBois, Department 16.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


POSTED:  3:00 PM

 

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