August 20, 2017
Law & Motion Department Tentative Rulings
  • Law and Motion Department Tentative Ruling Line:  (650) 261-5019
  • Other Judges' tentatives: please reference the appropriate Case Number and Case Caption below and contact the appropriate department.

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In the Superior Court of the State of California

In and for the County of San Mateo

 

Law and Motion Calendar

Judge: Honorable RICHARD H. DuBOIS

Department 16

 

400 County Center, Redwood City

Courtroom 7A

 

Wednesday, August 16, 2017

 

NOTICE TO ALL COUNSEL

 

Until further order of the Court, no endorsed-filed “courtesy copy” of pleadings is required to be provided to the Law and Motion Department.

 

 

IF YOU INTEND TO APPEAR ON ANY CASE ON THIS CALENDAR YOU MUST DO THE FOLLOWING:

 

1. YOU MUST CALL (650) 261-5019 BEFORE 4:00 P.M. TO INFORM THE COURT OF YOUR INTENT TO APPEAR.

2. You must give notice before 4:00 P.M. to all parties of your intent to appear pursuant to California Rules of Court 3.1308(a)(1).

 

Failure to do both items 1 and 2 will result in no oral presentation.

 

Notifying CourtCall with your intent to appear is not an alternative to notifying the court.

 

All Counsel are reminded to comply with California Rule of Court 3.1110.  The Court will expect all exhibits to be tabbed accordingly. 

 

    Case                  Title / Nature of Case

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16-CIV-02088     TREYANA PIERCE vs. BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., et al

 

 

TREYANA PIERCE                         SARAH SHAPERO

BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.                  ANDREA MCDONALD-HICKS

DITECH FINANCIAL, LLC                  MARY KATE SULLIVAN

 

 

1. DITECH FINANCIAL LLC’S DEMURRER To SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

On two prior occasions, the Court admonished Ditech for submitting a Request for Judicial Notice without plastic tabs between exhibits, in violation of CRC Rule 3.1110(f).  See Minute Orders dated March 10 and March 23, 2017.  The March 23 Order stated the Court will consider striking Ditech’s future filings if they do not comply with the Calif. Rules of Court.  With its present Demurrer, for the third time, Ditech submits the same Request for Judicial Notice and exhibits with no hard tabs.  Notwithstanding the prior admonishment, the court will move on to the merits of the motion.

In ruling on its prior Demurrer, the Court also admonished Ditech that its Code Civ. Proc. 430.41 meet and confer declaration did not comply with Code Civ. Proc. Sect. 2015.5.  See the Court’s March 23, 2017 Minute Order.   Ditech has now filed the present Demurrer, again with the same defective Sect. 430.41 declaration.  In light of the court’s intended ruling, further meet and confer appears pointless and, therefore, the court will hear the motion on the merits.

Defendant Ditech Financial LLC’s Demurrer to Plaintiff Treyana Pierce’s Second Amended Complaint (SAC) is SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND, as follows: 

The Demurrer to the First Cause of Action for negligence is SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.  The documents subject to judicial notice establish the decedent defaulted in 2010.  Thus, the loan was in default long before Plaintiff began making her alleged payments in 2013.  Ditech never accepted payments from plaintiff.  Despite being given multiple opportunities to amend, the SAC still includes no allegation Plaintiff ever made payments sufficient to bring the loan current.  That is, there is no allegation Plaintiff ever cured the default, despite, as alleged, being given roughly 18 months to do so.  Under the terms of the loan documents (the Deed of Trust). Defendant had the right to foreclose in the case of default.  Defendant also had the right to refuse to accept payments that did not cure the default. A successor-in-interest does not have more rights than the original borrower.  Whether or not the SAC sufficiently alleges Plaintiff was her father’s successor-in-interest, Ditech had the contractual right to foreclose per the loan terms.  A loan servicer generally owes no duty of care to a borrower when acting in its conventional role as a lender or servicer of a loan.  Nymark v. Heart Fed. Savings& Loan Assn. (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1089, 1095–1096.  Per the SAC’s allegations, Ditech was acting solely in its role as a loan servicer.  Additionally, Ditech cannot be held liable in negligence for refusing to accept partial payments on a loan in default, or for foreclosing on a loan in default, a right expressly granted by the Deed of Trust.  

Defendant’s Demurrer to the Second and Third Causes of Action for alleged violation of Bus. & Profs. Code Sect. 17200 are also SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.  These causes of action are based on the negligence cause of action, which fails as stated above.  Plaintiff also lacks standing to assert a Section 17200 claim, which requires factual allegations demonstrating injury-in-fact and a loss of money or property caused by Defendant’s alleged acts.  Plaintiff alleges she was damaged by loan payments she made from mid-2013 to January 2015, and accrued late fees.  Accrued late fees are not damage; Plaintiff has not alleged she paid any late fees.  The loan payments Plaintiff alleges she made prior to Jan. 2015 were required under the loan terms.  As stated, the SAC does not allege Plaintiff ever made payments sufficient to cure the default.  Neither a borrower nor his/her successor-in-interest has a right to live in a secured property for free.  A payment of less than the amount required under the loan terms is not “damage” sufficient to support the Sect. 17200 claim. 

 

Demurring party is directed to prepare a written order consistent with the Court’s ruling for the Court’s signature, pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312, and provide notice thereof to the opposing party/counsel as required by law and the California Rules of Court.  The order is to be submitted directly to Judge Richard H. DuBois, Department 16. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

2. DITECH FINANCIAL LLC’S MOTION TO STRIKE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

Defendant Ditech Financial, LLC’s (DiTech) unopposed Motion to Strike language in Plaintiff’s SAC requesting punitive damages is GRANTED.  The SAC alleges Ditech refused to work with Plaintiff and accept her attempted loan payments because she is not the borrower, and recorded a Notice of Trustee’s Sale because the loan was in default.  Plaintiff alleges she provided Ditech with a May 16, 2015 Probate Order, which states it “is not effective until Letters have issued,” and which required a $155,000 bond.  The SAC includes no allegation the bond requirement was satisfied, or that Letters ever issued.  Punitive damages are generally disfavored, and absent fraud, they require clear and convincing evidence of despicable conduct.  Ditech’s alleged conduct cannot reasonably be characterized as constituting malice, fraud, or oppression under Civ. Code Sect. 3294.  And Plaintiff has not opposed the motion to strike. 

 

Ditech’s unopposed Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees is GRANTED.  In general, attorney’s fees are recoverable only where authorized by contract or statute.  Code Civ. Proc. 1021; 1033.5(a)(10).  The SAC does not allege or identify any contract between Plaintiff and Ditech, nor any statute that authorizes fees.  And Plaintiff has not opposed the motion to strike.  

 

If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of the Court, pursuant to Rule 3.1308(a)(1), adopted by Local Rule 3.10, effective immediately, and no formal order pursuant to Rule 3.1312 or any other notice is required as the tentative ruling affords sufficient notice to the parties.

 



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17-CIV-02194   LUIS B. CABRERA vs. LONG BEACH MORTGAGE COMPANY, et al.

 

 

CABRERA, LUIS B.                       Pro/per

LONG BEACH MORTGAGE COMPANY

 

 

DEMURRER BY DEFENDANTS TO PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

This matter is dropped from calendar as an amended complaint has been filed.

 

 



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17-CIV-02320     IN RE D. SPENCER

 

 

BOISE HEIGHTS CORPORATION              EUGENE A. AHTIRSKI

 

 

PETITION FOR APPROVAL FOR TRANSFER OF STRUCTURED SETTLEMENT PAYMENT RIGHTS PURSUANT TO CALIFORNIA INSURANCE CODE §10134, ET SEQ. by petitioner

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

The Court DENIES, WITHOUT PREJUDICE, Petitioner Boise Heights Corporation's unopposed Amended Petition for Approval of Structured Settlement Payment Rights, filed on July 25, 2017.

Petitioner failed to timely file and serve its Notice of the continued hearing date.  (Ins. Code § 10139.5, subd. (f)(2); Code Civ. Proc. § 1013, subd. (a).) On June 26, the Court continued the hearing to July 25.  (Min. Order issued Jun. 26, 2017.) On July 24, Petitioner requested a hearing continuance to August 15 or the soonest date thereafter as "the monthly payment stream being purchased has changed and a new notice period is required." (Req. to Continue Hearing Date, filed 7/24/17. The Court continued the hearing to August 16. (Min. Order, issued Jul, 25, 2017.)

 

As a threshold matter, Petitioner failed to provide timely notice of the continued hearing date pursuant to Ins. Code § 10139.5, subd. (f)(2). 

 

Not less than 20 days prior to the scheduled hearing on any petition for approval of a transfer of structured settlement payment rights under this article, the transferee shall file with the court and serve on all interested parties a notice of the proposed transfer and the petition for its authorization.

 

Furthermore, Petitioner failed to timely serve by mail that Notice on all interested parties. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1013, subd. (a).)

 

The Court continued the hearing on June 26 in order for Petitioner to rectify the issues enumerated in the court's minute order. (Min. Order, issued Jun. 26 2017.) Petitioner filed its Amended Petition. That Petition cured all of these defects except perhaps in complying with Insurance Code section 10139.5, subdivision (c)(1), by failing to provide the payee's full address. (Am. Petition, p. 6:12; Spencer Dec., p. 1:5-6.)  

 

If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of the Court, pursuant to Rule 3.1308(a)(1), adopted by Local Rule 3.10, effective immediately, and no formal order pursuant to Rule 3.1312 or any other notice is required as the tentative ruling affords sufficient notice to the parties.

 

 



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17-CLJ-00320     CHI YAO-WU vs. THE BOILING BAY, INC.

 

 

CHI YAO-WU                             M. COLLEEN RYAN

THE BOILING BAY, INC.                  Gregory c. cheng

 

 

Motion to be relieved as counsel

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

Attorneys Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart motion to be relieved as counsel of record for Plaintiff is granted. 

 

If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of the Court, pursuant to CRC Rule 3.1308(a)(1), adopted by Local Rule 3.10.  If the tentative ruling is uncontested, ATTORNEY is directed to prepare, circulate, and submit a written order on the appropriate judicial council form for the Court’s signature, consistent with the requirements of CRC Rule 3.1312.  The proposed order is to be submitted directly to Judge Richard H. DuBois, Department 16.

 

 



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17-CLJ-00321     SHARON CHI vs. THE BOILING BAY, INC.

 

 

SHARON CHI                             M. COLLEEN RYAN

THE BOILING BAY, INC.                  Gregory c. cheng

 

 

Motion to be relieved as counsel

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

Attorneys Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart motion to be relieved as counsel of record for Plaintiff is granted. 

 

If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of the Court, pursuant to CRC Rule 3.1308(a)(1), adopted by Local Rule 3.10.  If the tentative ruling is uncontested, ATTORNEY is directed to prepare, circulate, and submit a written order on the appropriate judicial council form for the Court’s signature, consistent with the requirements of CRC Rule 3.1312.  The proposed order is to be submitted directly to Judge Richard H. DuBois, Department 16.

 



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17-UDL-00566     AMJAD QAQISH vs. LYNICIA THOMAS, et al.

 

 

AMJAD QAQISH                           Pro/per

LYNICIA THOMAS                         Shirley E. Gibson

 

 

DEFENDANT LYNICIA THOMAS’ MOTION TO SET ASIDE ENTRY OF DEFAULT AND VACATE DEFAULT JUDGMENT

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

The unopposed motion to vacate the default and to vacate the judgment is GRANTED.  Defendant has offered evidence to show that the default and default judgment were entered as a result of excusable neglect. 

 

Defendant shall file and serve the proposed answer no later than August 18, 2017.  

 

If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of the Court, pursuant to Rule 3.1308(a)(1), adopted by Local Rule 3.10, effective immediately, and no formal order pursuant to Rule 3.1312 or any other notice is required as the tentative ruling affords sufficient notice to the parties.

 

 



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CIV426301      EDWARD A. HUME VS. EDWARD D. HUME

 

 

EDWARD A. HUME                         DAVID M. MCKIM

EDWARD D. HUME                         Pro/per

 

 

Motion to compel ENFORCEMENT OF TERMS OF JUDGMENT

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

This matter is continued to September 12, 2017 at 9:00 a.m. in the Law and Motion department.

 



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CIV536047     MT. DIABLO, ET AL. VS. SOUTH BAY REAL ESTATE commerce

                 group llp, et al.

 

 

MT. DIABLO INVESTMENT GROUP, LLC             LVOVICH, MILLA L

SOUTH BAY REAL ESTATE COMMERCE GROUP LLP     RUSHIN, MARK A

 

 

MT. DIABLO INVESTMENT GROUP, LLC’s motion to enforce settlement

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

 

This motion is continued to September 18, 2017 at 9:00 a.m. in the Law and Motion Department.

 



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CIV537205     ACSEL HEALTH, LLC VS. CAMPBELL ALLIANCE GROUP, INC.

 

 

ACSEL HEALTH, LLC                      THOMAS M. MCINERNEY

CAMPBELL ALLIANCE GROUP, INC.           JONATHAN EDWARD

 

 

Defendants MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES FOR SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED complaint

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

Defendant CAMPBELL ALLIANCE GROUP, INC.’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees is GRANTED pursuant to Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16(c)(1).  However, the Court exercises its discretion to reduce the number of hours claimed to an amount that it deems reasonable. Robertson v. Rodriguez (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 347, 362.  Accordingly, fees are awarded to Defendant as follows: on the anti-SLAPP motion, Jonathan Sommer (75 hours x $445/hour); Kyle Withers (10 hours x $395/hour); David Ter Molen (5 hours x $485/hour); plus filing costs of $443.18.  On this fee motion, Jonathan Sommer (10 hours x $445/hour).  The total award is therefore $44,200.00 in attorney’s fees, and $443.18 in costs. 

 

Plaintiff questioned the hourly rates being charged by Defendant’s counsel; however, the court is aware that hourly billing rates of $445 per hour for a partner and $395 per hour for an associate is well within the reasonable range for a Bay Area law firm.   It is the number of hours being claimed that is of concern to the court.  Defendant claims that its attorneys spent a combined total of over 160 hours for the anti-SLAPP motion alone, plus another 27.7 hours for the fee motion.  This amount, particularly in connection with the relatively simple fee motion, is excessive.  The anti-SLAPP motion was not particularly difficult or novel, especially taking into consideration that Defendant’s local firm claims to be an expert in anti-SLAPP litigation.  There appears to be quite a bit of overlap and redundancy in the billing records, particularly with Chicago attorney David Ter Molen traveling here to attend the hearing on the anti-SLAPP motion, when he could have simply dialed in via CourtCall.  Mr. Ter Molen mostly did advisory work in this case, as he is involved in the North Carolina litigation; however, the bulk of the research and writing for the anti-SLAPP motion was done by Mr. Sommer and Mr. Withers.

 

As set forth in Plaintiff’s Opposition, there are several other problematic entries that should be stricken from this total. Plaintiff seeks to discount the number of hours by 86.55, which brings us to approximately 100 hours.  The court finds the following to be reasonable:

 

     Anti-SLAPP motion:

Jonathan Sommer (Partner, Lubin Olson): 124.1 75 hours x $445/hour

Kyle Withers (Associate, Lubin Olson):  13.95 10 hours x $395/hour

David Ter Molen (Partner, Freeborn Peters):  22.0    5 hours x $485/hour

Filing Costs:                     $443.18

 

Fee motion:

Jonathan Sommer:                  27.7 10 hours x $445/hour

 

Total:                            $44,200.00 fees, $443.18 costs

 

 

If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of the Court, pursuant to CRC Rule 3.1308(a)(1), adopted by Local Rule 3.10.  If the tentative ruling is uncontested, Campbell Alliance Group, Inc. is directed to prepare, circulate, and submit a written order reflecting this Court’s ruling verbatim for the Court’s signature, consistent with the requirements of CRC Rule 3.1312.  The proposed order is to be submitted directly to Judge Richard H. DuBois, Department 16.

 

 



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CIV537370     LOUIS A. LIBERTY VS. LIBERTY, OTTO & GUILLEN

 

 

LIBERTY, LOUIS A.                      SCHWARTZ, DAVID H

Liberty, otto & Guillen

 

 

LOUIS LIBERTY’S motion for release OF SETTLEMENT FUNDS TO KEVIN BREAZEALE, HYUNDAI CAPITAL AMERICA, AND LOUIS LIBERTY, AND FOR DISCHARGE AND DISMISSAL OF 6450 MOTORS, LLC

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

The Motion of Plaintiff and Interpleader Defendant Louis A. Liberty (“Plaintiff”) for Release of Settlement Funds is CONTINUED to 9:00 a.m. on August 24, 2017 in the Law and Motion Department. 

 

Plaintiff filed a “reply to the opposition by Defendants Ian Otto and Alexander Guillen (“Defendants”)”, but either defendant’s opposition was not filed with the court or is missing from the court’s file.  The court has, therefore, not had the opportunity to review it.  Defendants are therefore to file their opposition with the court on or before August 18, 2017.

 

If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of the Court, pursuant to Rule 3.1308(a)(1), adopted by Local Rule 3.10, effective immediately, and no formal order pursuant to Rule 3.1312 or any other notice is required as the tentative ruling affords sufficient notice to the parties.

 

 

 



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CIV537691     AMBER LAUREL BAPTISTE VS. MICHAEL LEWIS GOGUEN

 

 

AMBER LAUREL BAPTISTE                  PATRICIA L. GLASER

MICHAEL LEWIS GOGUEN                   DIANE M. DOOLITTLE

 

 

DEFENDANT/CROSS-COMPLAINANT MICHAEL GOGUEN’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR ISSUANCE OF A LETTER OF REQUEST REGARDING JOSEPHINE WALL

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

Pursuant to an Order to Show Cause issued on August 11, 2017, the hearing on this motion is stayed until further order of the court.

 

 



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16-CIV-02088     TREYANA PIERCE vs. BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., et al

 

 

TREYANA PIERCE                         SARAH SHAPERO

DITECH FINANCIAL, LLC                  MARY KATE SULLIVAN

BANK OF AMERICA                        ANDREA MCDONALD-HICKS

 

 

DEMURRER To SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT by Bank of America, n.a.

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

Defendant Bank of America, N.A.’s (BOFA) Demurrer to Plaintiff Treyana Pierce’s Second Amended Complaint (SAC) is SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND, as follows: 

BOFA’s Demurrer to the First Cause of Action for negligence is SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.  The documents subject to judicial notice establish the decedent defaulted in 2010.  Thus, the loan was in default long before Plaintiff began making her alleged payments in 2013.  Plaintiff alleges BOFA accepted some of her payments until Jan. 2015, but declined to accept payments thereafter.  Despite being given multiple opportunities to amend, the SAC still includes no allegation Plaintiff ever made payments sufficient to bring the loan current.  That is, there is no allegation Plaintiff ever cured the default, despite, as alleged, being given roughly 18 months to do so.  Under the terms of the loan documents (the Deed of Trust), Defendants had the right to foreclose in the case of default.  BOFA also had the right to refuse to accept payments that did not cure the default, and the right to accept payments without waiving its right to refuse future payments.  (RJN, Ex. A (DOT), p. 4, Par. 1).  A successor-in-interest does not have more rights than the original borrower.  Whether or not the SAC sufficiently alleges Plaintiff was her father’s successor-in-interest, BOFA had the contractual right to foreclose per the loan terms.  A loan servicer generally owes no duty of care to a borrower when acting in its conventional role as a lender or servicer of a loan.  Nymark v. Heart Fed. Savings& Loan Assn. (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1089, 1095–1096.  Per the SAC’s allegations, BOFA was acting solely in its role as a loan servicer.  Additionally, BOFA cannot be held liable in negligence for refusing to accept partial payments on a loan in default, or for foreclosing on a loan in default, a right expressly granted by the Deed of Trust.  

BOFA’s Demurrer to the Second and Third Causes of Action for alleged violation of Bus. & Profs. Code Sect. 17200 are also SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.  These causes of action are based on the negligence cause of action, which fails as stated above.  Plaintiff also lacks standing to assert a Section 17200 claim, which requires factual allegations demonstrating injury-in-fact and a loss of money or property caused by Defendant’s alleged acts.  Plaintiff alleges she was damaged by loan payments she made from mid-2013 to January 2015, and accrued late fees.  Accrued late fees are not damage; Plaintiff has not alleged she paid any late fees.  The loan payments Plaintiff alleges she made prior to Jan. 2015 were required under the loan terms.  As stated, the SAC does not allege Plaintiff ever made payments sufficient to cure the default.  Neither a borrower nor his/her successor-in-interest has a right to live in a secured property for free.  A payment of less than the amount required under the loan terms is not “damage” sufficient to support the Sect. 17200 claim. 

BOFA’s Request for Judicial Notice as to the recorded documents in Exhs. A-D is GRANTED.  Evid. Code Sect. 452(c), (h). 

 

Demurring party is directed to prepare a written order consistent with the Court’s ruling for the Court’s signature, pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312, and provide notice thereof to the opposing party/counsel as required by law and the California Rules of Court.  The order is to be submitted directly to Judge Richard H. DuBois, Department 16. 

 

 


 

 

In the Superior Court of the State of California

In and for the County of San Mateo

 

Presiding Judge Law and Motion Calendar

Judge: Honorable john l. grandsaert

Department 11

 

400 County Center, Redwood City

Courtroom 2D

 

Wednesday, August 16, 2017

 

NOTICE TO ALL COUNSEL

 

Until further order of the Court, no endorsed-filed “courtesy copy” of pleadings is required to be provided to the Law and Motion Department.

 

 

IF YOU INTEND TO APPEAR ON ANY CASE ON THIS CALENDAR YOU MUST DO THE FOLLOWING:

 

1. YOU MUST CALL (650) 261-5111 BEFORE 4:00 P.M. TO INFORM THE COURT OF YOUR INTENT TO APPEAR.

2. You must give notice before 4:00 P.M. to all parties of your intent to appear pursuant to California Rules of Court 3.1308(a)(1).

 

Failure to do both items 1 and 2 will result in no oral presentation.

 

Notifying CourtCall with your intent to appear is not an alternative to notifying the court.

 

All Counsel are reminded to comply with California Rule of Court 3.1110.  The Court will expect all exhibits to be tabbed accordingly. 

 

    Case                  Title / Nature of Case

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CIV535902     REGINA MANANTAN VS. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., ET AL.

 

 

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.                 BRIAN S. WHITTEMORE

REGINA MANANTAN                        TIMOTHY L. MCCANDLESS

 

 

Motion to Continue Trial Date by defendants

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

Defendants' Motion to Continue or Stay Trial Date, filed by defendants Wells Fargo Bank and US Bank National Association, based upon plaintiff's appeal of the Court's ruling sustaining the demurrer of co-defendant Moab Investment Group, is DENIED, WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

 

If the foregoing tentative ruling is uncontested, and is adopted at the time of the hearing of this matter, it shall serve as notice of the order of the Court, and no further notice need be provided by or to the parties.

 

 


 

 

 

 

 

 

 


POSTED:  3:00 PM

 

 

© 2017 Superior Court of San Mateo County